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MAKING EMINENT DOMAIN HUMANE
RALPH NADER*
& ALAN HIRSCH**
C ONSIDER an outlandish example: the United States government con-
demns a row of houses in the District of Columbia and transfers them
to the leaders of the majority political party for use as personal residences.
The prior homeowners, ordinary citizens who wish to remain in their
homes, are compensated at a price dictated by the government and forced
to move out.
Would anyone doubt that this naked abuse of power is unconstitu-
tional? In fact, case law suggests that the courts would uphold this action.
And while this particular measure has not been undertaken, other outra-
geous exercises of the eminent domain power occur regularly. This Arti-
cle addresses a legal doctrine run amok and proposes a solution.
The Constitution prohibits private property from being "taken for
public use, without just compensation."1 This so-called "Takings Clause"
implicitly authorizes the federal government to seize private property for
public use, provided just compensation is rendered. 2 The federal govern-
ment's authority of eminent domain has long been recognized.3  The state
governments also have this power, pursuant to their police powers. 4
No one questions the need for eminent domain authority. In order
to carry out their responsibilities, governments sometimes need land5 that
happens to be privately owned.6 But the power of eminent domain is not
unlimited. The Constitution speaks of takings for "public use," and it has
always been understood that seizures of private property are impermissible
* Ralph Nader is a consumer advocate and founder of several citizen
organizations. LL.B., with distinction, 1958, Harvard University; A.B., magna cum
laude, 1955, Princeton University.
** Adjunct Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Williams College. J.D.,
1985, Yale Law School.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875) (noting that both
state and federal governments may exercise power of eminent domain).
3. See id. (indicating that "political necessity" and "sovereignty" provide gov-
ernment with right to take land, unless fundamental law denies government such
right).
4. See id. at 371 ("No one doubts the existence in the State governments of the
right of eminent domain . . ").
5. E.g., to build public works infrastructure or military facilities.
6. See Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371 ("Such an authority is essential to [the govern-
ment's] independent existence and perpetuity. These cannot be preserved if the
obstinacy of a private person, or if any other authority, can prevent the acquisition
of the means or instruments by which alone governmental functions can be
performed.").
(207)
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absent a legitimate public use. 7 People enjoy constitutionally protected
property rights. 8 The government cannot seize their property unless it
will be used to benefit the public. 9
Nevertheless, the courts have come to interpret the "public use" re-
quirement in a way that renders it meaningless,' 0 essentially giving govern-
ments carte blanche to take property for any reason whatsoever, including
crass political purposes or speculative, transient economic purposes."
Moreover, the effects of such takings on innocent parties are ignored. In
other words, the power of eminent domain has become virtually absolute,
in contravention of the traditional understanding of the Takings Clause 12
and the prevailing understanding of governmental power generally. 13
In the process, the right of the American citizen to one of the most
cherished possessions-the home-has been trampled.14
7. See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding
that public use requirement applied only to federal government, not states). By
virtue of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, however, the public use require-
ment now limits the states as well. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; see also Chi. Bur-
lington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (holding that
states must abide by public use requirement).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... ).
9. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 444 (1978) ("Under
the classical nineteenth century approach, eminent domain power could be em-
ployed to appropriate private land for clearly public uses, such as the construction
of public roads; in contrast, any attempt to take private resources for the benefit of
other private parties ... would be invalid .... ").
10. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61,
61 (1986) (comparing public use requirement to "dead letter").
11. See generally Errol E. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History
and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1 (1981) (tracing history of public use requirement).
12. See, e.g., West v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 251 (1911) (rejecting
contention that "power over highways and eminent domain [is] ... absolute").
13. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (holding that
Congress's power to enforce Fourteenth Amendment "is not unlimited") (quoting
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970)); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 309 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (explain-
ing that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce is not unlimited);
Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 677 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that Congress's power to establish conditions for citizenship is "not unlim-
ited"); see also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 487 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("Since due process is the constitutional axis on which decision must
turn, our concern is not with absolutes, either of governmental power or of safe-
guards protecting individuals. Inquiry must be directed to the validity of the ad-
justment between these clashing interests .... "); Price v. INS, 962 F.2d 836, 844
(9th Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J., dissenting) ("[E]very... power of government ... is
circumscribed; it is not absolute."); Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffo-
cating the Constitutional Prerogative of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REV. 631, 637
(1997) ("[M]ost instances of governmental power ... must be balanced against
competing constitutional values.").
14. See ZygmuntJ.B. Plater & William Lund Norine, Through the Looking Glass
of Eminent Domain: Exploring the "Arbitrary and Capricious" Test and Substantive Ration-
ality Review of GovernmentalDecisions, 16 B.C. ENrTL. AFF. L. REv. 661, 663-64 (1989)
[Vol. 49: p. 207
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Part I of this Article describes the evisceration of the public use re-
quirement by the Supreme Court. Part II explores situations in which the
demise of a meaningful public use requirement has led to unconscionable
and unconstitutional consequences. Part III offers a concrete proposal for
reviving limitations on eminent domain so as to keep faith with the Consti-
tution's limits on government power and protection of individual rights.
More specifically, this Article advocates a workable standard for limit-
ing those situations in which the government may seize land from one
private party and transfer it to another (invariably more powerful) private
party.
I. EviSCERATION OF THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT
A half century ago, a commentator observed that courts had been so
lax in enforcing the public use requirement in eminent domain cases that
"neither state legislatures nor Congress need be concerned about the pub-
lic use test in any of its ramifications." 15 The Supreme Court has subse-
quently confirmed this proposition, most recently in the case of Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff16
Midkiff involved an effort by the Hawaii legislature to redress a long-
standing land oligopoly. 17 Hawaii's Land Reform Act of 1967 effectively
transferred title in real property from certain lessors to lessees, while com-
pensating the lessors.18 The lessors brought suit in federal court, arguing
that the Act unconstitutionally violated the public use requirement of the
Fifth Amendment' 9 (as applied to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment).20
The district court rejected the challenge, 21 but the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 22 The Ninth Circuit held
("Eminent Domain condemnation represents one of the legal system's most dras-
tic non-penal incursions into the rights of individuals .... ").
15. Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Re-
quiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 614 (1949).
16. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
17. See id. at 232-33 (indicating Hawaii Legislature's recognition of "concen-
trated land ownership was responsible for skewing the State's residential fee simple
market" and redressing problem by "requiring large landowners to sell lands which
they were leasing to homeowners").
18. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 516 (1976).
19. See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 234-35 (explaining that lessors opted not to pursue
arbitration, but rather to file suit in district court requesting court to declare Ha-
waii's Land Reform Act unconstitutional and to enjoin its enforcement).
20. See supra note 7 (illustrating that public use doctrine applies to both fed-
eral and state governments).
21. See Midkiffv. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62, 65, 70 (D. Haw. 1979) (limiting scope
of judicial review to whether plaintiffs were denied substantive due process and
holding that plaintiffs were not denied due process because statute was within leg-
islature's police power and was not arbitrary or capricious).
22. See Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983) (specifying that
whether state's exercise of eminent domain power is for public purpose is within
2004] 209
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that the statute lacked a sufficient public purpose; it constituted "a naked
attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to take the private property of A
and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and benefit."23 But the
United States Supreme Court reversed. 24 In the process, it essentially
eliminated the "public use" limitation on eminent domain. 2 5
The holding itself was defensible. The Court's jurisprudence had
long established that the public use requirement can be satisfied even
when the government does not keep or use the property seized, but in-
stead hands it to another private entity.26 After all, land may serve a pub-
lic use even in the hands of a private party.
The permissibility of government using eminent domain to transfer
property from one party to another, however, was traditionally leavened by
the understanding that this power would not be used solely as a means to
redistribute wealth-to take from X to give to Y solely for the benefit of
y 2 7 Moreover, it presumably makes some difference whose land is taken.
For example, seizing a family farm on which generations have lived seems
quite different from seizing an apartment building leased for profit.28
These distinctions were ignored by Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Midkiff Rather than emphasizing the justification of the public use in
scope ofjudicial review and holding that "provisions of the Hawaii Reform Act that
provide for the condemnation of certain residential property are facially
unconstitutional").
23. Id.
24. See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 231-32 (holding that "the Public Use Clause of [the
Fifth] Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, [does not] prohibit[ ] the State of Hawaii from taking, with just compensa-
tion, title in real property from lessors and transferring it to lessees in order to
reduce concentration of ownership of fees simple in the State").
25. See Laura Mansnerus, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent
Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 409, 423 (1983) (explaining that Court doctrine "so
short-circuits the inquiry as to erase the public use requirement").
26. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954) (upholding District
of Columbia's Redevelopment Act of 1945, which used eminent domain power to
redevelop slum areas by selling and leasing condemned lands to private interests);
see also Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) ("It is not
essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion .... di-
rectly enjoy or participate [in the benefit of the land for it] to constitute a public
use.").
27. See TRIBE, supra note 9, at 446 (noting that none of Lochner cases "contra-
dicted the proposition that it was illegitimate for a legislature to transfer resources
from one citizen to another for the very purpose of making the social or economic
distribution more just") (emphasis in original).
28. Certainly in other areas of law it is routinely assumed that the permissibil-
ity of a government's action may turn, in part, on the nature of the right or interest
infringed by the action. See infra text accompanying notes 52-59.
[Vol. 49: p. 207
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question, 29 or the relatively small harm,3 0 the Court swept aside virtually
any objection to any exercise of eminent domain. 3 1
The Court gave away the game at the outset when it grappled with the
definition of "public use." The Court's definition? Whatever the govern-
ment says it is. The Court, in Midkiff quoted language from its seminal
case of Berman v. Parker
3 2
The definition [of "public use"] is essentially the product of legis-
lative determinations addressed to the purposes of government,
purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete
definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when
the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared
in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not
the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be
served by social legislation .... 33
The Court did go on to acknowledge that "[t] here is, of course, a role
for courts to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what constitutes
a public use." 34 This role, however, is "extremely narrow. ' 35 The stan-
dard the Court employed is so narrow as to be virtually nonexistent-the
judgment of public use stands "'unless the use be palpably without reason-
able foundation.'-
36
The Court conceded that its cases "have repeatedly stated that 'one
person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another private per-
son without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be
paid."' 37 The Court, however, clarified that the taking will be upheld as
29. See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 232 (noting state interest in breaking up oligopo-
lies and finding affordable housing for indigent). Both breaking up oligopolies
and providing affordable housing are legitimate governmental purposes. See, e.g.,
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 674 (1965) (Douglas, J., con-
curring) (noting that one purpose of antitrust laws is to prevent oligopolies); see
also United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (2000) (providing
legislation for affordable housing for low-income people).
30. Wealthy landowners were deprived of some means of profit.
31. Of course, stating that Midkiff was defensible does not imply that it was
decided correctly. For example, a leading legal libertarian has argued that the
"oligopoly," which justified the condemnation and transfer, was not really an oli-
gopoly at all. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 180-81 (1985) ("The [government] presumes that when a
sufficiently large number of persons declare that they are willing but unable to buy
lots at fair prices the land market is malfunctioning.").
32. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
33. Midkiff 467 U.S. at 239 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32
(1954)).
34. Id. at 240.
35. Id. (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
36. Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668,
680 (1896)).
37. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80
(1937)).
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long as "the exercise of eminent domain power is "rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose."38 This means that the taking will be upheld as
long as the means used are "not irrational."3 9
The Court denied that its opinion rendered the public use require-
ment a dead letter:
[T]he Constitution forbids even a compensated taking of prop-
erty when executed for no reason other than to confer a private
benefit on a particular private party. A purely private taking
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it
would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would
thus be void.40
This qualification, however, is meaningless because it is always possi-
ble for government to concoct an ostensibly public purpose for its ac-
tions. 4 1 Recall the outlandish hypothetical at the outset of this Article: the
United States government condemns a row of houses in the District of
Columbia and transfers them to the leaders of the majority political party
for personal use. Congress could argue that its overworked leaders need
spacious, nearby personal space in order to clear their heads and effec-
tively carry out their public responsibilities. However repugnant such a
measure, it is surely not "irrational."4 2 It cannot be said to lack a "conceiv-
able" purpose.43 And creating conditions for elected representatives to
work effectively seems "legitimate" enough. Thus, by the terms of the
Court's own jurisprudence, such an indefensible, self-serving measure
would be upheld.44 If one takes the Court's analysis seriously, virtually any
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 243.
40. Id. at 245.
41. See AKHIL AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITU-
TION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 137-38 (1998) (noting, in context of equal
protection doctrine, that "rational basis" test "essentially dooms all claimants, since
the government can almost always advance some explanation" for its actions).
42. As an empirical matter, it is seldom, if ever, the case that Congress or state
legislatures act in a wholly irrational manner. They may act selfishly, short-sight-
edly, foolishly, even maliciously, but they invariably have some reason for their
action.
43. Indeed, the "conceivable purpose" criterion is particularly weak because it
"suggests that the court, in its search for a 'rational basis,' can supply a purpose the
legislature itself missed." EPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 162.
44. See id. at 179 (explaining that by virtue of eminent domain jurisprudence,
"the question remains whether any condemnation of land can be attacked for want
of a public purpose").
[Vol. 49: p. 207
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exercise of the eminent domain power will be upheld.45 And, indeed, this
state of affairs has come to pass.
4 6
II. CONSEQUENCES OF DEMISED PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT
We have seen that under Midkiffs policy of total deference, virtually
any exercise of eminent domain will receive judicial approval. 47 While
suggesting that naked redistributionism (to reward one's friends and pun-
ish one's enemies, for example) fails to meet the public use test, the Court
adopted a standard so lax that anything short of that will pass the test.48
There is a second problem with Midkiff. the Court failed to come to
grips with the nature of the private interest affected. The Court did not
address the interests of the landowners in Midkiff The implication of this
silence is that the nature of the condemnee's interest in the condemnee's
property makes no difference to the court reviewing the taking.
49
As it happens, the condemnees in Midkiff-oligopolic landlords-
were not especially sympathetic. But what happens when land is taken not
from those for whom it is used solely for profit, but from people who use it
as a home and community?50 By virtue of the Court's approach, it makes
no difference. 5 1 The sole inquiry is whether the taking produces a public
45. To the extent the Court's deference stems from the Constitution's textual
authorization of government takings, the Court interprets the Constitution oddly.
While reflecting the necessity of government authority to take land, the Takings
Clause is clearly aimed at limiting takings. By treating takings as constitutionally
favored, rather than permitted but disfavored, the Court perverts the spirit of the
clause. See Plater & Norine, supra note 14, at 664 (noting "Alice-in-Wonderland
twist").
46. See id. at 674 (" [D] ecisions to condemn, short of lunacy, are supported in
court by a practically irrefutable presumption of validity."). The authors found
"only one federal case striking down a state condemnation action on public-use
grounds . . . ." Id. at 683 n.68 (surveying federal case law). Though there are
happily some exceptions, most state courts have been equally deferential. See id. at
689 (surveying state case law regarding eminent domain).
47. The Court has subsequently reaffirmed this policy of extreme deference.
See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422-23 (1992)
(following Midkiff and Berman in upholding ICC's eminent domain proceeding to
benefit Amtrak); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1014-16 (1984) (allowing
EPA to take and disclose private information for public use).
48. See Plater & Norine, supra note 14, at 697 ("[T]he judicial insulation of
eminent domain only has equivalents in the far more portentous fields of national
security, international relations, and political questions.").
49. The silence echoed the Court's indifference to the condemnee's interests
in Berman, the previous seminal case on eminent domain. See Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954) (ignoring property interests of previous owners).
50. Needless to say, wealthy entrepreneurs and homeowners of modest means
do not exhaust the class of condemnees. See, e.g., Cmty. Redev. Agency v. Abrams,
543 P.2d 905, 908-09 (Cal. 1975) (allowing place of business of elderly pharmacist
to be condemned and transferred as part of urban renewal program).
51. One obvious difference is that the person who uses land solely for profit
can be made whole by monetary compensation. See U.S. CONST. amend. V
(prohibiting taking of private property for public use without providing just com-
pensation to deprived party).
2004] 213
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benefit, with no effort to balance the alleged benefit against the harm it
might cause.
One explanation for the Court's approach lies in its attitude towards
property rights. In the infamous Lochner v. New York 52 case and its prog-
eny, the Court elevated the property rights of businessmen over the wel-
fare of employees, striking down legislation designed to protect employees
as violating the employer's "substantive due process" rights.5 3 The Court
eventually repudiated this line of cases,5 4 but it remains a haunting mem-
ory,5 5 which prevents justices from differentiating between different types
of property rights. 5 6
Significantly, the Court has retained the doctrine of substantive due
process upon which Lochner and its progeny were based. 57 In its second
incarnation, substantive due process did not protect the rights of business-
men to engage in unfettered capitalism, but did protect the rights of citi-
zens to be free from governmental intervention in their most basic choices
in life, 58 such as whether to have children. 59
Put crudely, the Court came to decide that "liberty," more than "prop-
erty," is a fundamental constitutional right that cannot be infringed absent
a compelling governmental justification. 60 Given the historical context,
this made sense. In the Lochner line of cases, the Court rejected attempts
52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
53. See, e.g., id. at 52-53 (striking down statute regulating number of hours
baker could work); see also Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923)
(striking down law establishing minimum wage for women); Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (striking down statute banning "yellow dog" contracts-
contracts requiring workers to refrain from union membership as condition of
employment).
54. See Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952) (overruling
Lochnerdirectly); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938)
(holding that economic regulation must be upheld if merely rational).
55. See EPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 277 (noting influence of "the ghost of
Lochner").
56. For a further discussion of courts not differentiating between different
types of property rights, see supra text accompanying notes 50-52 (indicating
Court's refusal to differentiate between homeowner property and business-owned
property).
57. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4 (1938) (implying that substantive
due process, while inappropriate in cases of economic legislation, protects certain
personal liberties).
58. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (providing for right to have
abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (providing for right of
married couples to use birth control).
59. Even before the seminal Griswold case, Judge Learned Hand noticed "a
stiffer interpretation of the 'Due Process Clause' when the subject matter is not
Property but Liberty, as that word has now come to be defined." LEARNED HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 50 (1958).
60. See, e.g., William W. Fisher, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings
Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1774, 1789 n.72 (1988) (noting "Supreme Court's
treatment of property rights as less deserving of vigorous defense than 'civil
rights'").
214 [Vol. 49: p. 207
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by the political branches to protect particularly vulnerable employees.
The parties adversely affected by the legislation would have been denied
only the greater profit that came from exploiting the vulnerable. In the
subsequent line of cases that applied "substantive due process" in connec-
tion with liberty, rather than property, the Court protected citizens from
what were perceived as powerful majorities imposing their moral stan-
dards. At least to the extent one sees a judicial role in protecting vulnera-
ble minorities from overzealous majorities,6 1 one can understand how the
Court came to elevate liberty rights above property rights.
62
The problem is that a liberty/property dichotomy is too crude. The
Constitution may protect autonomy more than wealth, but these terms are
not interchangeable with "liberty" and "property."6 3 There are different
kinds of property rights: those that are purely economic and those that
more closely resemble the kind of rights and liberties we have come to
regard as sacred. 64 The post-Lochner aversion to property rights blurs this
distinction.6 5
The eminent domain jurisprudence in general, and the Midkiff
Court's failure to address the nature of the harm to those whose land was
seized, reflect the blurring of this distinction. Current eminent domain
doctrine implies that everything a person owns is mere "property."66 Gov-
ernment can slap a price tag on it and take it away.
67
61. SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7-8 (1980) ("The tricky task
has been and remains that of devising a way or ways of protecting minorities from
majority tyranny .... ").
62. See TRIBE, supra note 9, at 919-90 (approving both rejection of Lochner and
flowering of protections for liberty/privacy, noting that "[t]he point of Lochner's
downfall was not the rejection of human freedom as an idea, but the recognition
that there was less of such freedom, in the ordinary workings of the economy, than
sometimes met the eye").
63. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Pro-
tected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1986) (discussing complex relationship be-
tween liberty and different forms of property).
64. See MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 978-
1013 (1982) (discussing, in detail, different types of property rights).
65. See Mansnerus, supra note 25, at 428 (explaining that in eminent domain
jurisprudence, courts assume that "all property rights may be treated alike").
66. See Thomas J. Loyne, Note, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: A Final
Requiem for the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain ?, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
388, 396 (1985) ("[T]he Supreme Court has seemingly characterized all takings as
economic regulatory measures which do not impinge on individual liberty
interests.").
67. As it happens, that price is often inadequate because "just compensation"
fails to take into account the full psychic and economic costs imposed on displaced
homeowners. See infra note 81 (explaining inadequacy of compensation to home-
owners in situations where financial or emotional loss accompanies relocation be-
cause government is only required to pay for what it gets). For present purposes,
however, the more important point is that in some cases no amount of compensa-
tion is enough. We do not think we can throw a person behind bars and simply
compensate that person for the deprivation of liberty. The situation is comparable
when the government destroys a community and offers to compensate members of
the erstwhile community.
9
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What is sometimes taken, however, is every bit as personal and cher-
ished as the liberty/autonomy elsewhere protected zealously. 68 In other
words, courts have failed to acknowledge what commentators have had
less trouble identifying: property can be a foundation for "self-determina-
tion and self-expression," 69 and "personal property" can be inseparable
from liberty.70 When the government seeks to condemn a person's home,
it threatens not the putative right of a powerful corporation to unlimited
wealth, but "the right of the otherwise powerless individual to hold his
dearest possession." 7 1 Undeniably, "[d]isplacement from one's home,
however mitigated by compensation, effectively defeats" a person's
autonomy.
72
Ironically, when it comes to protecting activities within the home,
rather than the home itself, the Court has shown great sensitivity.7 3 In
cases involving both the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment, the
Court has attached special significance to the home74 and struck down
laws that impermissibly compromised the right to be free of government
intrusion into one's home. 75 "[A] man's home is his castle," the Court
once opined. 7
6
Apparently, a man's home is his castle in a limited sense only. The
government cannot barge in without a search warrant, and it cannot tell
people what to read behind their own doors, but it can seize the entire
house and kick them out.
77
68. In a different context, the Court has recognized that "a fundamental in-
terdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right
in property." Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
69. Frank I. Michelman, Mr. Justice Brennan: A Property Teacher's Appreciation, 15
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv., 296, 299 (1980).
70. See Radin, supra note 64, at 959 (explaining that when certain property,
such as one's wedding ring, is lost or stolen, financial compensation cannot restore
status quo).
71. Plater & Norine, supra note 14, at 679 n.45.
72. Mansnerus, supra note 25, at 431.
73. To be sure, a recent counter-trend seems to be developing in all branches
of government, with increased use of "sneak and peek" search warrants and recent
passage of the "Patriot Act," expanding the government's leeway to search homes
and monitor activity within the home.
74. The Court is correct in recognizing the special constitutional status of the
home. See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 41, at 133 ("[T]here is an important link
between the Third Amendment [prohibiting quartering of soldiers in homes] and
the Fourth (which restricts searches and seizures)-both protect 'houses' from
needless and dangerous intrusions by government officials.").
75. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (striking down
statute punishing possession of obscene material within one's home, noting that
plaintiff "is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-the right to
satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home" (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added)).
76. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973).
77. This is especially ironic given the fact that the Framers of the Constitution
considered physical seizure of property to be much more of a concern than regula-
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The deficiency in eminent domain doctrine 78 comes into focus when
we look at a state court case, which, though decided pre-Midkiff took the
identical approach. In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,79 the
land seized was not from wealthy landowners who rented it for profit, but
from middle-class homeowners in a tight-knit neighborhood. In addition
to hundreds of homes, the city seized a dozen churches, a hospital, an
array of schools and many small businesses. Thus, the harm to the dis-
placed homeowners was not lost income but "severance of personal attach-
ments to one's domicile and neighborhood and the destruction of an
organic community of a most unique and irreplaceable character."80 The
people of Poletown could not be adequately compensated81 because they
regarded their community as literally priceless. 82
Poletown powerfully illustrates the fatal flaws in current eminent do-
main doctrine: the rubber-stamping of any proffered "public use" of con-
tion or limitation of its use. See generally William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782
(1995) (providing detailed analysis of Takings Clause).
78. Another possible explanation for this failure, apart from the legacy of
Lochner, stems from the text of the Fifth Amendment, where "public use" and "just
compensation" are the only express limitations on eminent domain. In other
words, the amendment does not indicate that the nature of the interests affected
by a taking should be considered. But as a defense of current eminent domain
doctrine, such rigid textualism proves much too much. The notion that constitu-
tional rights and powers are not absolute-even absent explicit textual limits-
pervades constitutional law. In the oft-cited example, the right to free speech does
not entail the right to falsely shout "fire" in a crowded theatre (even though the
First Amendment mentions no limits on free speech). There is no reason why
eminent domain should be the only power interpreted in a vacuum, impervious to
competing constitutional values.
79. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
80. Id. at 481 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
81. Even if adequate compensation were theoretically possible, the law does
not begin to provide it in cases like Poletown. Compensation is severely curtailed by
the notion that "the government need only pay for that which it gets." EPSTEIN,
supra note 31, at 52. As a result, "consequential damages of all sorts have been
excluded" from calculations of appropriate compensation. Id.; see also Plater &
Norine, supra note 14, at 683 ("Just compensation, even in the hands of a sympa-
thetic jury, may fail to compensate condemned landowners for a wide range of felt
losses-sentimental value, some forms of ongoing business value, the costs of relo-
cation in financial and emotional terms-these are some of the areas of private
loss that go uncompensated in eminent domain."). For example, the elderly or
infirm may be able to walk to the supermarket, a luxury not necessarily available in
other neighborhoods. Family and friends living in proximity may assist them with
housekeeping and transportation. Such invaluable assets (among many others) of
a particular location are ignored in the calculation of "just" compensation.
82. To take just one example, can a price be put on the value of seeing one's
children and grandchildren grow up or continuing at the place of worship one
attended as a youth? See EPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 52 (noting "associational depri-
vations" suffered by Poletown residents).
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demned land and the indifference to the severe suffering that such
seizures can impose. 8 3
What brought about the destruction of this community? In 1980,
General Motors informed Detroit of its plans to close two plants-unwel-
come news for a city already in the midst of a major recession. General
Motors offered, however, to build a new assembly complex in Detroit, ca-
pable of employing 6,500 workers if a suitable site could be found. The
company set forth several criteria (e.g., size, shape and access to transpor-
tation). The city conducted a study of several potential sites and con-
cluded that only one was feasible-approximately 465 acres in Detroit.
General Motors agreed to the site, but insisted that it receive title to the
parcel by mid-1981. Pursuant to a "quick-take" eminent domain statute,8 4
the city moved expeditiously to seize the land.
The site General Motors chose encompassed a close-knit, multi-racial
residential neighborhood (called "Poletown") consisting primarily of first-
and second-generation Polish Americans and African-Americans. The re-
sidents of Poletown brought suit to enjoin the condemnation, but a trial
court ruled against them and the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the
ruling.
The Michigan Supreme Court's opinion is a stunning instance of
bloodless formalism. One reading it would never guess that the decision
devastated real live human beings. The court (with five justices in the ma-
jority and two justices dissenting) upheld the exercise of eminent domain,
using precisely the reasoning the Supreme Court would employ in Midkiff
several years later. 85 The court's "analysis" was straightforward: 1) Prece-
dent supports the notion that "public use" requires only a public purpose.
A transfer of land to a private party meets that test if it serves to benefit the
public. 2) The political branches make the determination and courts
83. For criticism of Poletown in its immediate aftermath, see Barry Bennett,
Eminent Domain and Redevelopment: The Return of Engine Charlie, 31 DEPAUL L. REv.
115 (1981); Peter E. Millspaugh, Eminent Domain: Is It Getting Out of Hand?, 11 REAL
EST. L.J. 99 (1982); EmilyJ. Lewis, Comment, Corporate Prerogative, 'Public Use' and a
People's Plight: Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 1982 DET. C. L.
REv. 907; see alsoJEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED (1989) (describ-
ing events leading up to and following Poletown decision).
84. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 213.57 (West 2003) (providing that if mo-
tion to review, pursuant to section 6 of Michigan Compiled Laws, is either not filed
or is denied, title to property vests in agency as of date complaint is filed).
85. The court, however, based its analysis on Michigan's Constitution and
cases, not the federal analogues. This was appropriate. While state courts are
bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Consti-
tution's Takings Clause, they are free to find that their state constitution or statutes
give greater protection to citizens than does the Federal Constitution. See William
J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv.
489, 491 (1977) (stressing that state courts protect not only federal constitutional
rights of their citizens, but also their state constitutional rights, and latter may
exceed former). Most state constitutions have an independent takings clause.
[Vol. 49: p. 207
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must show it extreme deference. 3) Reducing unemployment is clearly a
public benefit.
There were two major problems with the court's opinion. First, it
failed to take seriously the fact that it was essentially approving any transfer
of land to a private party. While paying lip service to the notion that the
proposed public benefit cannot be "speculative and marginal,"' 6 it simply
accepted, without question, Detroit's assertions about the economic bene-
fit of the transfer.8 7 Thus, the court abandoned one traditional task of an
appellate court-to review the evidentiary record.88
Second, the court spoke as if it were looking at a mere economic reg-
ulatory measure, making no mention of the plaintiffs' painful plight. In-
deed, the court casually and callously referred to their "abstract right"89 to
remain in their homes.
It was left to the dissent to raise key issues that the majority simply
ignored. Unlike the majority, the dissenting judges saw fit to acknowledge
the harm to plaintiffs, noting that "their home was their single most valua-
ble and cherished asset and their stable ethnic neighborhood the un-
changing symbol of the security and quality of their lives."9 0 While the
majority waxed rhapsodic about the likely gain in employment and tax
revenue, it never mentioned that "the dislocations and other costs of the
project are also massive,"9 ' including the displacement of more than 3,400
people.9 2 (Indeed, while trumpeting the prospective economic benefits
of the plant, the majority never mentioned that it would cost taxpayers
more than $300,000,000 in federal, state and local subsidies.)
86. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 460
(Mich. 1981).
87. Indeed, the notion that this exercise of eminent domain was valuable to
Detroit's economy is problematic. For one thing, it was brought about by GM's
threat to relocate, which may have been a bluff. See Plater & Norine, supra note 14,
at 675 n.38. Moreover, there was ample evidence that several nearby abandoned
industrial sites would have sufficed for the proposed plant, even if they were not
optimal from GM's standpoint. See id. n.37 (explaining that "[t]he Poletown envi-
ronmental impact statement" identified nine potential sites for General Motor's
factory but that each was rejected because none of them met GM's specific site
criteria; and explaining that GM also rejected additional available sites that would
not require relocating houses, churches and small businesses, because sites did not
meet GM's "rectangular criterion").
88. While appellate courts are usually deferential in reviewing a trial court's
fact-finding, at a minimum they ensure that such fact-finding is not plainly against
the weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Avita v. Metro. Club, 49 F.3d 1219, 1229 (7th
Cir. 1995) ("[W]e take seriously the responsibility of an appellate court to review
the sufficiency of the evidence.").
89. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
90. Id. at 470 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 464 n.15 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
92. Actually, while GM proposed displacing 3,400 people, it turned out that
more than 4,200 relocated because of the project. Relocation Unit of Neighbor-
hood Service Organization, City of Detroit, Survey: 1981-82 Central Industrial Park
Relocation Project I.
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While recognizing that even strong private interests may on occasion
have to yield to eminent domain authority, the dissentingjustices took the
court to task for its simplistic acceptance of the city's claims.
It may be replied that the offsetting costs and benefits of the transfer
are for the political branches, not the courts, to weigh.9 3 Even the major-
ity, however, acknowledged that a "speculative" claim of economic gain
does not suffice to support the "public use" requirement. 94 As one of the
dissenting judges persuasively argued, the City of Detroit's claims were
highly speculative indeed:
[T]here are no guarantees from General Motors about employ-
ment levels at the new assembly plant. . . . [T]here will be no
public control whatsoever over the management, or operation,
or conduct of the plant to be built there.... Who knows what the
automotive industry will look like in 20 years, or even 10? For
that matter, who knows what cars will look like then? For all that
can be known now, in light of present trends, the plant could be
fully automated in 10 years.9 5
As the above suggests, there are crucial differences between tradi-
tional use of eminent domain power for a highway, railroad or canal, to be
owned and used by the public in the long-term, and the exercise of emi-
nent domain power to transfer land to a private party based on its mere
unenforceable promises to employ a certain number of people. While
government must tend to the plight of the unemployed, the location of an
automobile plant to enhance employment and economic development is a
far more contingent, speculative and transient public benefit than the
building of public infrastructure.
96
There was, indeed, no guarantee that General Motors could fulfill its
prediction that it would employ 6,500 workers.9 7 Even if it made good on
that prediction, what would happen if economic conditions changed in a
93. See, e.g., Disenos Artisticos v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 97 F.3d 377, 380
(9th Cir. 1996) ("We should not put our thumb on the legislative scale. A court
construing a statute should avoid adding to or detracting from the benefits Con-
gress accorded to any of the competing interests.").
94. See supra text accompanying notes 86, 91 (indicating that Michigan Su-
preme Court stated that speculative benefits to public are not sufficient to satisfy
public use criteria, but then used potential employment and tax benefits to justify
upholding city's taking of Poletown homeowners' property).
95. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
96. Indeed, the dissent's claim that one could not reliably foresee trends in
the automobile industry was borne out. See Donald W. Nauss, GM Wo?*ers Fear
What's Down the Road; Outsourcing Is Threat to All in Industry, They Say, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1996, at D-1 (noting precarious state of automobile industry in Poletown
and elsewhere). It must also be noted that the seizing of Poletown cost many jobs,
as scores of small businesses were forced to uproot.
97. In fact, GM eventually reduced its goal of employment to three thousand,
"economic conditions permitting." Gary Blonston, Poletown: The Profits, the Loss,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 21, 1981 (Magazine), at 8. In the end, more people
were displaced than employed.
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year? These same workers could be laid off.98 Worse still, General Motors
might decide to relocate yet again. 99 Or the economy might take a turn
for the better (as indeed happened), making the "rescue" effort unneces-
sary. 100 Should these things happen, those who lost their homes, as well as
the taxpayers that footed the bill for their compensation, would have no
recourse.' 10 And surely there are other ways for Detroit to combat unem-
ployment than providing a huge taxpayer subsidy to one particular corpo-
ration and transferring this particular land to it.1 °2
Amidst all the uncertainties inherent in the transfer, one thing was all
too certain: the residents of Poletown lost their homes and neighborhoods
to General Motors. They are not alone-increasingly, eminent domain
power is used not for some great public undertaking, but instead to re-
ward a private business. 10 3 DaimlerChrysler recently prevailed upon To-
ledo, Ohio, to obtain the land of eighty-three homeowners and several
98. See EPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 167 (suggesting that when government takes
property and places it into hands of private parties, benefits of eminent domain
will less likely be "divided among the public at large"). According to Epstein:
[T]he taking of a piece of land for a lighthouse or a naval shore installa-
tion cannot give rise to the abuse in which one individual calls upon the
state to do something he is unable to do himself. The property taken
remains in the control of the United States, and no private party subse-
quently obtains an undivided interest in the condemned property.
Id.
99. See Kevin L. Cooney, A Profit for the Taking: Sale of Condemned Property After
Abandonment of the Proposed Public Use, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 751, 752 (1996) (stating
that condemnor "may take property in fee simple for an 'alleged' public use, while
actually engaging in a form of real estate speculation, and later reap a profit from
the sale of the property").
100. See generally id. (discussing transient and contingent nature of benefits of
land transferred to private parties via eminent domain).
101. Under current law, when a party granted land by eminent domain fails
to make good on its promise to use the land for the public benefit, there is gener-
ally no recourse. See, e.g., Beistline v. City of San Diego, 256 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir.
1958) (stating that public use is 'judged solely by the conditions existing at the
time of the taking"); Mainer v. Canal Auth. of State, 467 So. 2d 989, 992-93 (Fla.
1985) (holding that abandoning public use does not impair party's title, rejecting
collateral attack on taking and holding that such challenges must be made at con-
demnation proceeding, not subsequently). One way to deal with the problem is a
statutory "claw back" provision requiring a corporation to pay back abated benefits
when it fails to deliver on the promise(s) that induced the benefits. There was no
such provision to protect the people of Poletown.
102. For a further discussion of ways Detroit could combat unemployment,
see infra notes 144-46, 157 and accompanying text.
103. See Dean Starkman, Take and Give: Condemnation Is Used to Hand One Busi-
ness Property of Another, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at Al (discussing state and local
governments' increased use of eminent domain); see also Unnecessary Business Subsi-
dies: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Budget, 106th Cong. 6-212 (1999) (state-
ment of Ralph Nader, consumer advocate), available at http://www.nader.org/re
leases/63099.html (June 30, 1999) [hereinafter Nader's Testimony] (noting
"trend whereby state and localities abuse their eminent domain powers to serve
private parties" and bring about "the literal destruction of longstanding homes,
neighborhoods and communities").
2004]
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small businesses and transfer it to the automobile company for use as a
truck planting and staging area. 11 4 As it happens, the government did not
need to condemn the land; the mere threat of doing so induced the re-
sidents to accept a dubious agreement. 10
5
Similarly, in Hurst, Texas, a developer prevailed upon the city to buy
out or force out 137 homeowners to provide additional parking space and
access roads for a shopping mall. 10 6 So too, land may be seized from
homeowners and small businesses to build gambling casinos, 10 7 athletic
stadiums1 ° 8 and for other trivial purposes such as landscaping. ' 0 9
Under the courts' hands-off approach to eminent domain, these re-
verse Robin Hood actions are rubber-stamped, regardless of the magni-
tude of the human cost, the triviality of the public benefit or the
availability of feasible alternatives.' 10 As one of the dissenting judges in
Poletown stated:
104. That, at any rate, was the ostensible purpose of the transfer. But in the
company's own mapped plan, the area in question was designated for landscaping.
See Nader's Testimony, supra note 103, at 30 (discussing DaimlerChrysler's in-
tended use of land obtained by eminent domain).
105. As this episode illustrates, the mere threat of eminent domain sometimes
exacts costs even greater than would the actual exercise of the power. By making it
known that homes will be condemned unless a settlement is reached, the govern-
ment elicits settlements quickly and at low cost. There is an obvious element of
duress in these vastly imbalanced bargaining situations, resulting in settlements
more unfavorable to residents than what might result from an eminent domain
action. (The few homeowners who did not sign off on the settlement, and hired
attorneys instead, ended up with far greater compensation.)
106. See Jim Schutze, Landmark Dispute; Texas Homeowners Forced Out for Mall
Expansion, Hous. CHRON., June 4, 1997, at Al (discussing use of eminent domain
to expand shopping mall in Hurst, Texas).
107. See generally Casino Reinv. Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1998) (discussing eminent domain power to build gambling casino).
In that case, regulators sought to condemn land adjacent to tycoon Donald
Trump's casino, so Trump could build a parking lot and limousine-waiting station.
In a rare instance of the "public use" requirement being taken seriously, the supe-
rior court struck down this exercise of eminent domain. See id. at 111 (finding that
primary interest served by taking was private interest rather than public interest).
108. See Pamela Edwards, How Much Does That $8.00 Yankee Ticket Really Cost?
An Analysis of Local Governments' Expenditure of Public Funds to Maintain, Improve or
Acquire an Athletic Stadium for the Use of Professional Sports Teams, 18 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 695, 705-13 (1991) (discussing eminent domain power to acquire land to build
sports stadiums).
109. In Poletown, General Motors needed less than half of the allotted space
for its factory and parking-the rest was used for landscaping.
110. See Nader's Testimony, supra note 103, at 29-30. Nader noted that in the
case of Toledo's transfer to DaimlerChrysler:
There is virtually no binding reciprocal obligation on DaimlerChrysler in
the agreement-to create jobs, maintain a certain job level or to agree to
set wage levels or working conditions. In exchange for no binding com-
mitments and no share of the profits, Toledo has agreed to put up huge
sums of money, much of it borrowed.
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The decision that the prospect of increased employment, tax rev-
enue, and general economic stimulation makes a taking of pri-
vate property for transfer to another private party sufficiently
"public" to authorize the use of the power of eminent domain
means that there is virtually no limit to the use of condemnation
to aid private businesses. 1 1
As a result, no home "is immune from condemnation for the benefit of
other private [commercial] interests."1 1 2
Not surprisingly, Poletown's critics have spanned the political spec-
trum.113 Conservatives object to government coercion and disrespect for
private property in service of speculative claims about the public good." 4
Liberals object to the exercise of government authority on behalf of the
powerful and at the expense of the powerless.'1 5 But the courts regard as
acceptable the use of eminent domain witnessed in Poletown.116
And yet, the dissenting opinions in Poletown were not altogether satis-
factory either. The dissenting judges implied that the transfer of land to a
private party should never satisfy the public use requirement. 1 7 Such a
111. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464
(1981) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. To take prominent examples, progressive consumer activist Ralph Nader
organized resistance to the land condemnation, and conservative legal scholar
Richard Epstein is among its critics.
114. See EPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 83 (stating that in Poletown, "the state's use
of force is too obvious . . . to be denied").
115. See Plater & Norine, supra note 14, at 680 (indicating that in Poletown "the
largest American corporation accurately presumed that it could enlist the powers
of government in its behalf to override the . . . claims of lower-income
landowners").
116. Just a few years after Poletown, the Supreme Court endorsed the ap-
proach of the Michigan Supreme Court, reinforcing its earlier holdings that courts
must essentially rubber-stamp exercises of eminent domain, even when they in-
volve a transfer of land to a private party. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 244 (1984) ("[h1f a legislature, state or federal, determines there are substan-
tial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determina-
tion that the taking will serve a public use."). For a further discussion of how
courts rubber-stamp exercises of eminent domain, see supra notes 10-11, 15-16,
and 21 and accompanying text.
117. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 464 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (stating that
condemnation went "beyond the scope of the power of eminent domain [to]
take[ ] private property for private use"); id. at 465 (Ryan,J., dissenting) (opposing
"condemnation of private property for private use"). To be sure, the dissenting
judges went out of their way to distinguish cases involving eminent domain trans-
fers to private parties as part of "slum clearance." See id. at 462 (Fitzgerald, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing slum clearance cases-where ultimate disposition of
land to private interests is incidental to primary purpose of promoting public
health and welfare through removal of existing plight-from cases like Poletown,
where disposition of property to General Motors was not incidental to public pur-
pose of taking). They seemed to do so only because they had no choice (lest they
contradict established Michigan law), and they provided no clear criteria for de-
marcating appropriate transfers to private parties.
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rule, which has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court1 18 and
most states, l" 9 may be overbroad. After all, one can imagine circum-
stances where the condemnation and transfer produce a direct and impor-
tant public benefit that simply could not otherwise be achieved.' 20 By
positing the issue in all-or-nothing terms (whereby transfers of land to pri-
vate parties are either rubber-stamped or automatically prohibited), both
the majority and the dissent painted with too broad a brush.' 2 '
Is it possible to find a workable middle ground that does not give the
courts too much power and too little guidance and that protects both the
rights of individuals and the important prerogatives of the state?
III. PROPOSAL FOR REVIVING EMINENT DOMAIN LIMITATIONS
Consistent with the analysis in the previous sections, courts should
subject eminent domain takings to strict scrutiny where three conditions
are present: 1) the land is transferred to another private party rather than
held by the public; 2) the individual interest of those whose land is taken is
particularly strong and monetary compensation cannot significantly com-
pensate for the loss; and 3) the party whose land is taken is relatively pow-
erless politically. Under such circumstances, the state should have to
demonstrate a compelling need for the transfer, one which cannot be met
by other less harmful alternatives.122 Wholly speculative or transient bene-
fits should not suffice.'
23
Where the first condition is present, but the second or third condi-
tions are not, the transfer should still be subject to heightened scrutiny,
but not to the same extent. Specifically, where the condemned land is
given to a private party, but the aggrieved party suffers primarily economic
loss (which can be compensated), or the party is not politically powerless,
118. For a further discussion of instances in which transfers to private parties
involved valid public uses, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
119. See Mansnerus, supra note 25, at 415 (noting that in a series of slum-
clearance cases in the 1940s and 1950s, "[v]irtually every state court was forced to
decide the constitutionality of government initiatives that, contrary to the tradi-
tional view [of eminent domain], took land from A and gave it to B... [a]nd with
few exceptions the courts" validated such actions).
120. Suppose, for example, some undeveloped land, owned by a developer,
abuts a private hospital. For the sake of public health, the land is needed to add a
wing to the dangerously overcrowded hospital. Few would doubt that a condemna-
tion and transfer would be appropriate in that circumstance.
121. To be sure, the dissent's approach at least comports with the text of the
Takings Clause because there is no public "use" (only a public "benefit") when
land is transferred to a private party.
122. A few state courts have taken into account the availability of alternative
means of achieving the alleged public purpose. See, e.g., Madison County v. Elford,
661 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Mont. 1983) (holding condemnation improper because of
failure to consider alternative highway route); State v. Superior Court, 222 P.2d
208, 210 (Wash. 1924) (holding alternate zone would be less harmful to private
interests).
123. A reasonable application of this standard would surely prevent the kind
of manifest injustice that took place at Poletown.
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the action should be upheld if it is substantially connected to an important
government purpose.1 24
The first obvious benefit of the proposed approach is that it distin-
guishes between the traditional taking, in which the public retains the con-
demned land, and the taking that transfers land to another private party.
The latter would be subject to greater scrutiny because, as one commenta-
tor observed, "when the government plans to transfer title, acting not as
owner but as site-acquisition agent, the term 'public use' is a legal conclu-
sion. A public use must be shown to exist, not merely declared to
exist." 125
The two-tiered approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to other infringements on individual rights. 126 The notion that
the state's justification for an action must be proportionately stronger
when the infringed right or interest is strong is well settled in other parts
of constitutional law. 127 It makes perfect sense to import this principle to
the law of eminent domain. 128 It is one thing to take title of land from
wealthy landlords, but quite another to take away people's homes. The
right to be secure in one's home, made explicit in the Fourth Amend-
ment, surely ought to protect against removal of that home absent a com-
pelling governmental justification. 129
124. This second tier scrutiny would apply in a case like Hawaii Housing Au-
thority v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Whether it would have resulted in rejection
of the land transfer is unclear because the Court's analysis of the facts was skimpy.
See id. at 234-36 (stating facts). Given the Court's standard of extreme deference, it
saw no need to describe the underlying facts in any detail.
125. Mansnerus, supra note 25, at 425.
126. At the federal level, adoption of the proposed new approach to eminent
domain would require the Supreme Court to reinterpret the Takings Clause (or
Congress to take an improbable action and reduce its own power). State courts,
however, need not mimic the Supreme Court's approach to eminent domain.
Most states have their own constitutional or statutory "public use" requirement,
and they are free to find that their own law gives greater protection to citizens than
does its federal counterpart. For a further discussion of state legislation relating to
eminent domain, see supra note 4. In the case of eminent domain, a few states
have done that. See Plater & Norine, supra note 14, at 689-97 (discussing state
condemnation cases).
127. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238,
263 (1986) ("[Clompeling state interest is necessary to justify any infringement on
First Amendment freedom." (emphasis in original)).
128. See Plater & Norine, supra note 14, at 680-89 (observing that under cur-
rent doctrine, challenges to condemnations focus almost exclusively-and with fu-
tility-on whether proposed use of land serves public purpose). The authors
lament that this focus neglects the relative benefits of the condemnation and the
harms it imposes. See id. (suggesting that courts, both state and federal, do not
provide adequate review of substantive merits of condemnation). The approach
proposed in the present essay would redirect the inquiry so as to confront these
critical questions.
129. Needless to say, the fact that displaced homeowners receive compensa-
tion hardly alleviates the problem. See supra notes 71-72, 80-82 and accompanying
text. See also Donald J. Kochan, 'Public Use' and the Independent Judiciary: Condemna-
tion in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 49, 55 (1998) (noting that
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The idea of subjecting actions to higher scrutiny where the transfer is
to a private party, and special scrutiny when those whose land is seized are
relatively powerless, dovetails perfectly with equal protection doctrine.
Under equal protection law, stricter scrutiny is required when certain pow-
erless groups are affected, in part because the groups cannot protect
themselves13 and in part because we question the motives of the govern-
ment when it takes actions that adversely affect groups that have been his-
torically subjected to unfavorable treatment. 3 1
Both of these factors-suspicion of government motive and imbal-
ance of power-come into play when government transfers land from one
group to another private (and invariably more powerful) group. 132 Con-
sider the description by the dissent (not disputed by the majority) in
Poletown of the political realities underlying the eminent domain transfer
in that case.
First, the dissent noted, in the choice of location for the General Mo-
tors plant, "It]he fundamental consideration . . . was the corporation's
enlightened self-interest as a private, profit-making enterprise." 33 Gen-
eral Motors gave Detroit an ultimatum, which sparked a "frenzy of official
activity" driven by "the unmistakable guiding and sustaining, indeed con-
trolling, hand of the General Motors Corporation." 134 The city's eager-
ness to oblige reflected "the withering economic clout of the country's
largest auto firm."' 35 Clearly, "what General Motors wanted, General Mo-
tors got.' 36 Detroit "chose to march in fast lock-step with General Mo-
tors" 13 7 at the expense of powerless citizens with "limited power to protect
themselves."1
3 8
A political tussle pitting General Motors against the elderly, un-
wealthy citizens of Poletown is like a football game between Penn State
founding fathers were concerned with "protection" and "preservation" of private
property, not merely compensation).
130. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28(1973) (citing political powerlessness as criterion in equal protection cases that
plays role in triggering heightened judicial scrutiny).
131. See ELY, supra note 61, at 136-48 (discussing relevance of government
motivation in equal protection analysis).
132. See Kochan, supra note 129, at 52 ("[T]he beneficiaries of a relaxed pub-
lic use standard are often powerful and wealthy special interests capable of con-
vincing the state to use its power to displace residents from their homes and
businesses."); see also RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 682 (5th ed.
1998) (noting that democratic legislative process frequently results in "unprinci-
pled redistribution of wealth in favor of some politically effective interest group").
133. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 466
(Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 468.
135. Id. at 469.
136. Id. at 470.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 463 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
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and a junior college.' 3 9 It is precisely when such an imbalance exists140
that courts should be most willing to scrutinize government action.'
4
'
To be sure, it is not as though the Detroit officeholders responded
exclusively to a threat of withheld campaign contributions (though that
dynamic obviously may come into play). 142 They responded to, inter alia,
an economic crisis. And this side of eminent domain cannot be ignored-
,he power to seize lands stems from a very real need for government to
provide for the people at large. But this does not mean that courts should
rubber-stamp any and all means that a government chooses-no matter
how oppressive towards groups that cannot protect themselves.1 43
It is not as though Detroit, or the state of Michigan, had to choose
between destroying a community and acquiescing in a harmful recession.
Even apart from available alternative sites, cities and states always have nu-
merous means to revive a slumping economy.' 4 4 Targeted or across-the-
board tax credits, loans and public works programs have often had success
in this regard. Such measures are not free of cost, 14 5 but the burden is
139. For a detailed discussion of the ability of powerful special interest groups
to prevail upon municipalities to exercise eminent domain on their behalf, see
generally Kochan, supra note 129.
140. "Quick take" statutes, which enable exercises of eminent domain to oc-
cur before compensation is even offered (much less decided) and before a com-
munity has the opportunity to organize and protest, exacerbate this imbalance. See
generally Mansnerus, supra note 25, at 435 (discussing efficiency and disputes re-
garding "quick take" statutes); see also Edward P. Lazarus, The Commerce Clause Limi-
tation on the Power to Condemn a Relocating Business, 96 YALE L.J. 1343, 1343 (1987)
(discussing condemning businesses on verge of relocation as unconstitutional).
141. See ELY, supra note 61, at 75-77 (suggesting that courts engage in stricter
scrutiny of legislation that is targeted at religious, national or racial minorities).
142. See Kochan, supra note 129, at 82 ("[T]he special interest is likely to have
more political influence, because unlike the landowner, the interest group is prob-
ably a repeat player in the political process and thereby able to offer more to
legislators.").
143. See Radin, supra note 64, at 1005-06 (expressing surprise that taking of
family home is not subjected to stricter scrutiny).
144. Some state courts have raised the question of "necessity" in evaluating
certain condemnations. See Plater & Norine, supra note 14, at 690-91 (discussing
state interpretations of "necessity" and citing cases). The inquiry has taken the
form of "whether legislative purposes could have been better accomplished by dif-
ferent governmental means." Id. at 691; see also Meidinger, supra note 11, at 47
(recommending necessity test).
145. But, then again, neither was the $350 million subsidy package for Gen-
eral Motors. Such money could have been put to many uses to help the economy.
Note that we are not advocating that courts intervene in policymaking, i.e., requir-
ing the government to undertake a particular means to achieve its end. Rather,
consideration of feasible alternatives would simply be germane to whether the ex-
ercise of eminent domain is justified. Indeed, some enterprising state courts have
undertaken such an analysis. See Plater & Norine, supra note 14, at 692 (discussing
occasional state substantive eminent domain review). By analogy, courts strike
down legislation that infringes on the right to free speech when they find that less
restrictive alternatives were available. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n,
123 S. Ct. 2297, 2311 (2003) (discussing legitimacy of statute's objective and less
restrictive alternatives). The courts do not, however, order the government to im-
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spread across the tax-paying population, not imposed on a single group
whose lives are forever altered.
14 6
Quite simply, not all exercises of eminent domain are created equal.
But under current doctrine, all are treated equally, which is to say that all
are deemed permissible. 147 Take two opposite scenarios. In one case, the
government seizes the land of a General Motors plant (and compensates
the company accordingly) to build a government-owned railroad, deemed
critical for interstate commerce over the next one hundred years. In the
other case, the government seizes the homes of hundreds of elderly Polish
and African-American residents and hands it to General Motors, with the
hope that jobs will be created and the economy improved. Now consider
some of the critical differences between the two scenarios:
1) In the first, the effected party has a monetary interest only. In the
second, the effected parties lose their homes and community.
2) In the first, the transferred land remains in the hands of the pub-
lic, where it will presumably serve the public indefinitely. In the second,
the transfer clearly serves to enhance the wealth of an already wealthy pri-
vate party and will presumably enhance the short-term benefit of the pub-
lic. Longer-term effects involve many variables, making them difficult to
predict.
3) In the first, the effected party has powerful political options and
allies to resist the seizure and to seek redress (at the ballot box) if it fails.
In the second, the effected parties have little influence.
148
Does it make any sense to treat these situations identically?1 49 Or is
there not an overwhelming case to be made for subjecting the second to
plement any particular alternative. See Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)
(requiring "narrowly tailored" but not necessarily least restrictive means).
146. The Takings Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960).
147. See, e.g., Kochan, supra note 129, at 51-52 (noting that "public use provi-
sion.., retains little meaning today" because courts will approve eminent domain
power "for almost any use").
148. See Mansnerus, supra note 25, at 435-36. According to Mansnerus:
While burdened property owners are not "discrete and insular minori-
ties" within the meaning suggested in Carolene Products and developed by
constitutional scholars, they are nonetheless isolated. Even the 4,200 re-
sidents of Poletown . . .could at most influence one or two of the city
council members who voted on the plan, and the individual owner in
such a situation is all but unrepresented.
Id. (citations omitted).
149. Of course, not all cases of eminent domain fit either of these two scena-
rios. The second tier of our proposed two-tiered approach recognizes a third pos-
sibility-the condemned land is transferred to a private party, but those from
whom the land is taken are not politically powerless and/or suffer primarily eco-
nomic (and therefore compensable) loss. The land ends up in the hands of a
private party, with all the attendant uncertainty and suspicion of governmental
motives. For this reason, such transfers warrant greater scrutiny than when the
[Vol. 49: p. 207
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stricter scrutiny to ensure that it takes place only if truly necessary? 150
Sound public policy, respect for individual rights, analogy to other areas of
law and recognition of the courts' proper role in our society all point to
differential treatment.'51
Another advantage to importing the fundamental rights and antidis-
crimination approach to eminent domain law becomes apparent when we
consider one of the Supreme Court's early justifications for its policy of
near-total deference to governmental takings. Writing for the Court in a
1946 case, Justice Hugo Black argued that "[a] ny departure from this judi-
cial restraint would result in courts deciding on what is and is not a gov-
ernmental function and in their invalidating legislation on [that] basis...
a practice which has proved impracticable in other fields."
1 52
In fact, the standard proposed above does not require such a determi-
nation. Courts would rarely invalidate a taking on the basis that the prof-
fered public use was not a government function. Rather, they would
evaluate whether the government function was so compelling, and the ex-
clusive action taken in service of it so necessary, that it trumps the rights of
those whose land is seized. 153 The well-developed and reasonably stable
property remains in public hands, but less scrutiny than when the aggrieved party
is powerless and suffers severe damages largely unameliorated by financial com-
pensation. Thus, we subject the second-tier cases to intermediate scrutiny. Our
use of these two tiers of heightened scrutiny obviously mirrors the Court's ap-
proach in antidiscrimination cases where strict scrutiny is reserved for particularly
suspicious actions and intermediate scrutiny applies in situations provoking less-
but still some-suspicion. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCI-
PLES AND POLICIES 519 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing levels of scrutiny in discrimination
cases).
150. A few state courts seem in accord that heightened judicial scrutiny is
justified when title is transferred to a private party. See, e.g., Denihan Enters. v.
O'Dwyer, 99 N.E.2d 235, 238 (N.Y. 1951) (finding judicial scrutiny "less critical ...
where the state itself is to be vested with the property"). Of course, even where the
condemned land remains publicly owned, it does not necessarily follow that the
governmental purpose is legitimate-some judicial scrutiny remains appropriate.
The government may, for example, condemn land and convert it to a railroad, not
because such a railroad serves the public, but because it benefits a particularly
influential corporate contributor. Or the government may convert the land into a
public highway because doing so enhances access to a casino owned by a tycoon.
151. In addition to all of the above, our proposed approach may dovetail per-
fectly with the Framers' intent. According to one scholarly account, the rationale
behind the 'just compensation" clause was protection of government confiscation
of the property of the powerless. See generally Treanor, supra note 77 (explaining
history of and reasons for Takings Clause). Translating this understanding to
modern day reality, Treanor proposes "interpret[ing] the Takings Clause to pro-
vide heightened protection to the property interests of those who have been sin-
gled out and the property interests of discrete and insular minorities." Id. at 856.
While he focuses on securing persons' compensation in various situations that
courts traditionally have not considered "takings," his analysis is consistent with the
goal of preventing takings that destroy powerless communities.
152. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552
(1946).
153. This would reverse the disturbing anomaly, under current doctrine, in
which "[c]ondemnation takings, with their drastic effects on private interests, are
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body of fundamental rights and antidiscrimination law (which undertake
just such an inquiry) belies the notion that such an approach is inherently
impracticable. 154
Indeed, given the courts' track record in eminent domain cases, the
real risk is not that heightened scrutiny would unleash wanton judicial
activism, but that even the higher standard will not provide sufficient pro-
tection: judges may still be overly reluctant to find relative powerlessness
and overly willing to credit speculative economic benefits. 155 To guard
against this risk, thought should be given to objective guidelines that facili-
tate the application of the proposed criteria. For example, where eminent
domain proceedings transfer land to a corporation that promises to create
economic benefits, the corporation could be required to demonstrate the
certainty of those benefits to the satisfaction of neutral experts. And the
corporation's representations could be treated as contractually binding,
with a "claw back" provision 15 6 serving as a remedy for a violation. If the
corporation can convince a municipality and a court that it will create X
number of jobs within Yyears, it should be held to the promise.' 57
Likewise, when farmland or residential land is seized and transferred
to a profitable corporation, courts can assume relative powerlessness, 15 8 or
at least employ a rebuttable presumption. Where the displaced party (or
parties) is a business (or businesses), perhaps the Department of Com-
merce's definition of "small" business can be used as a yardstick to indicate
what constitutes a relatively powerless economic enterprise.' 59
even less scrutinized than governmental actions generally." Plater & Norine, supra
note 14, at 697.
154. Although some state courts have shown a willingness to subject condem-
nations to stricter scrutiny, this "has apparently not caused major problems be-
tween the tripartite divisions of state government." Id. at 692.
155. For a discussion ofjudges' ruling-class bias, see ELY, supra note 61, at 58-
60.
156. For a further discussion of "claw back" provisions, see supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
157. This may seem unduly stringent, but it is actually consistent with the kind
of binding contracts into which parties often enter. Here, the exercise of eminent
domain would amount to such a contract: the corporation is given land in consid-
eration for a pledge to produce a certain number ofjobs. There are several possi-
ble remedies for breach of this contract, e.g., forfeiture of the land or a stiff
monetary payment (perhaps to be distributed among those displaced by transfer).
158. This, too, is consistent with equal protection doctrine. Not all blacks, for
example, are politically powerless, but any legislation targeting blacks for unfavora-
ble treatment (even in locales where blacks have significant political clout) re-
ceives heightened scrutiny.
159. This would be valuable because not all exercises of eminent domain that
transfer land from a powerless private party to a relatively powerful private party
involve homeowners. There are instances of land taken from a "mom and pop"
business and given to a more economically and politically powerful business. Note,
too, that the "mom and pop" shop, like the homeowner, may have a strong, non-
compensable interest in remaining in a particular location.
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As with every legal doctrine, contours and guidelines will emerge.
The examples above show how courts can put meat on the bones of the
proposed criteria for evaluating eminent domain transfers from one pri-
vate party to another. Whatever precise model emerges, the case for
heightened scrutiny of such actions is compelling.' 6
0
Giving meaning to the constitutional phrase "public use" and ensur-
ing that application of the Takings Clause does not run roughshod over
other constitutional values are perfectly legitimate exercises of the judicial
role. The judiciary, however, need not exclusively undertake the ap-
proach proposed herein. Enlightened legislatures should be eager to de-
velop guidelines for courts to apply in evaluating exercises of eminent
domain.
There is, however, a regrettable disincentive for state legislatures to
adopt such steps. 16 ' Adoption of a federal legislative standard could pre-
vent state governments from a "race to the bottom"'162 in their eagerness
to please corporate benefactors by using eminent domain without any
meaningful public use.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts cannot undo every legal doctrine that defeats the public
interest or contravenes society's norms. It might be, for example, that a
doctrine derives from the Constitution and therefore should not be
changed except through amendment. Alternatively, the doctrine may de-
rive from legislation and should be changed only through the political
process. And, even if the doctrine could be modified without usurping
the authority of the Founding Fathers or any legislature, it may be that its
160. It is especially compelling because persons whose land is taken may be
too intimidated to bring suit. See Treanor, supra note 77, at 873-75 (explaining
difficulties minorities have in effectuating legislative process). The case can also
be made to permit taxpayers to challenge exercises of eminent domain. See Peter
D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax
Incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L. REv. 377, 413 (1996) ("[C]itizens who depend
on government services and who pay nonbusiness taxes have a stake in raising
constitutional challenges to business tax breaks, a stake that may be sufficient to
motivate advocacy groups representing such interests to take the issue to court.").
Enrich notes that "[m]ost states have recognized, either by statute or by case law, a
right of state taxpayers to bring suit in state court to challenge allegedly illegal or
unconstitutional state activities." Id. at 414. In the case of eminent domain, the
bill to compensate those displaced is ultimately footed by taxpayers. They should
be given standing to sue and to argue that the exercise of eminent domain (or the
threatened exercise that results in a buy-out) is unconstitutional. See id. at 413-18
(arguing in favor of taxpayer standing to challenge state tax incentives, noting that
"[i] n several states that have confronted this issue, the answer has favored taxpayer
standing," and collecting cases). Another suitable measure is repealing statutes
that permit "quick take" exercises of eminent domain.
161. See Enrich, supra note 160, at 380 (noting phenomenon "in which com-
petitive pressures compel [states] to adopt measures contrary to their citizens'
interests").
162. See id. (discussing unhealthy interstate competition).
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modification cannot be achieved by the courts without undoing a settled
body of law and creating chaos ag courts wrestle with cases absent appro-
priate guidance or constraints.
In the case of current eminent domain doctrine, none of these cir-
cumstances is present-nor any other circumstance that counsels in favor
of continuing the status quo. The notion that government can use its emi-
nent domain power to transfer land from powerless individuals to power-
ful private parties, for virtually any purpose whatsoever, in no way derives
from the Constitution or any statute. If there is a reason for courts to
avoid a more searching scrutiny of the exercise of eminent domain power,
it must be because doing so would' involve them in an ad hoc exercise lack-
ing clear standards. 163 But, as we- have seen, this is not the case.
Considerations of public policy support importing the approach used
in fundamental rights law and antidiscrimination law to the law of emi-
nent domain. By doing so, the courts can make eminent domain law hu-
mane and fulfill their promise to restrain the other branches of
government and protect the rights of American citizens.
164
163. See Plater & Norine, supra note 14, at 698 (indicating that there is no
basis in text of Constitution or original intent of Framers for insulating eminent
domain from judicial review; evidence suggests Framers intended active judicial
protection of property rights against eminent domain power).
164. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEw BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN
RIGHTS, NAMED & UNNAMED (1997). (arguing eloquently for recognition of broad
corpus of constitutional rights beyond those currently respected by courts). Pro-
fessor Black specifically argues for the constitutional rights that enable the most
vulnerable members of society to live with a modicum of dignity.
Black sees such rights as grounded in the Declaration of Independence, the
Ninth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution.
See id. at 5 (listing these doctrines as.United States government's highest level of
commitment to "reasoned constitutional law of human rights"). By making the
case that new rights spring from venerable sources, his book is a useful corrective
to the trend of disparaging claims of new rights as the product of an illegitimate
adventurism. Our argument for limiting the exercise of eminent domain fits
within and modestly applies Black's broad perspective. The approach we have pro-
pounded would confer a new degree of protection for citizens against the reaches
of governmental power. Does this mean that judges who adopt our proposed ap-
proach would be guilty of 'judicial activism"? Quite the contrary. It is a form of
judicial activism (that is, a departure from the text and traditional understanding)
for courts to treat the power of eminent domain as absolute. In demanding that
courts give meaning to the requirement of "public use," our approach is doctri-
nally conservative. And in seeking guidance by analogy to settled bodies of law
(especially the law of equal protection) and reference to established constitutional
values (e.g., the sacred status of the home), we proceeded in a fashion commended
by Professor Black and consistent with time-honored tools of interpretation. See
generally id.
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